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The countries of Central America did not manage to 
escape the effects of the crisis of the 1980s, despite 
having pursued a relatively conservative external 
financing policy. Although their external debt was 
mainly public or backed by the government, the 
increase in interest rates and deterioration in the 
terms of trade created considerable external imbal-
ances which forced them to apply stringent adjust-
ment policies. Economic activity weakened and the 
countries had to choose between finding new sources 
of financing or transferring the whole impact of the 
crisis to the domestic economy. 
Although in absolute terms the external debt of 
Central America amounts to barely 4% of the 
region's total debt, the ratio of external debt to pro-
duct is double the Latin American average. Only 
Guatemala has moderate relative debt figures. The 
various reprogramming rounds have succeeded in 
deferring the problem for a time without solving it 
and arrears and accumulations of unpaid interest and 
principal have occurred. 
The author says that the renegotiation pro-
cesses have not considered the real capacity of each 
country to service ¡ts debt, with the result that the 
agreed repayment periods have been too short and 
the costs too high. He also states that the use of the 
available internal and external investment funds 
must be decided with great care, bearing in mind that 
external resources must be a complement to and not 
a substitute for national development efforts. 
•Head of the Section of Economic Development, 
International Trade and Statistics at liCLAC's Mexico City 
office. 
Introduction 
The Central American economy is currently suf-
fering the effects of the deepest and longest 
economic crisis of the last four decades. The fall 
in output, combined with inflationary tensions, 
has cut back the real incomes of a large part of 
the population. The already high unemployment 
and underemployment indices have grown even 
bigger and other imbalances have worsened, 
including in particular the fiscal deficit and the 
balance of payments. 
One of the most critical distortions, which is 
largely responsible for this economic perfor-
mance, is the foreign trade gap. This is now at an 
unprecedented level in Central America, while 
for various reasons it is increasingly difficult for 
the countries of the area to obtain external 
financing. 
On the one hand, the unfavourable terms of 
trade resulting from the instability of export 
prices and the sustained rise in import prices 
have continuously undermined the purchasing 
power of sales to countries outside the region. 
On the other hand, this instability, combined 
with higher costs, has slowed down the produc-
tion of farm goods for export. The volume of 
foreign sales has therefore tended to stagnate or 
even, in some countries, to decline. Added to this 
is the decline in tourism services, due basically to 
the social and political upheavals in the region, 
and the increasing interest payments on the for-
eign debt, producing the extremely difficult 
situation indicated by the current account of the 
balance of payments. 
The continuous increase in intra-zonal trade 
for about the past 20 years demonstrates the 
high degree of interdependence of the econo-
mies of the Central American Common Market 
(CACM), the autonomous strength of which has 
survived the political and other differences 
among the five countries of the Isthmus. How-
ever, the financial restrictions have been creat-
ing a critical situation which is threatening to 
have a profound effect on the CACM and to 
accentuate the downward trend in each of the 
economies. Although the common market is still 
in existence, financial difficulties caused by glo-
bal imbalances in the balance of payments have 
prompted the countries to apply increasingly 
strict exchange restrictions which have also 
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affected trade within Central America. Further-
more, the countries with surpluses in this trade 
have had to limit their sales because it is impossi-
ble for them to grant or expand easy payment 
facilities to the others owing to their own finan-
cial difficulties and their deficits with the rest of 
the world. 
The flow of external financing to Central 
America grew dynamically during the period 
1970-1983- This financing also underwent major 
changes as a result of the shifts in the interna-
tional economy and various general economic 
policy measures, including in particular the bor-
rowing modalities adopted by the countries of 
the region. These changes manifested them-
selves mainly in the volume of funds mobilized, 
in the main sources of funds and in the standard 
terms of the new debt. 
Up to 1973 external financing had comple-
mented the national investment efforts. 
Between 1973 and 1978 it increased considerably 
as a proportion of total savings and was becom-
ing a dynamic element which enabled the coun-
tries to cope with the great imbalances generated 
by the trade flows. In this period the countries' 
increasing need for external financing coincided 
By 1970 the region's external debt amounted to 
US$1 350 million, 48% of which consisted of 
loans contracted or guaranteed by the State, and 
52% of obligations to the private sector. 
As an average for the area, the amount of the 
external commitments could be considered mod-
erate in both relative and absolute terms. For 
example, the per capita foreign debt was US$88, 
or roughly 25 % of the average annual product of 
Central America, and its absolute level was 
almost equivalent to exports of goods and 
services. 
Nevertheless, from the beginning of the 
decade important differences were emerging 
among countries, with respect both to the total 
value and to the structure of the foreign debt. In 
1970 Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Guatemala had 
with a ready supply of funds from international 
banks at low capital cost, and this produced a 
dramatic change in the situation: an increase in 
the participation of private sources ¡n the exter-
nal public debt. 
This trend grew stronger from 1978; exter-
nal financing now provided a majority of savings 
and financing from private sources acquired a 
dominant role in the total flow of external funds. 
Lastly, in the past four years (1983-1986) the 
situation became asymmetric. On the one hand, 
interest rates in the international capital market 
had increased rapidly from 1981 —although 
they moderated in 1986— producing a consider-
able increase in the cost of the existing debt and a 
worsening of the external imbalance of the econ-
omies. On the other hand, the reduced supply of 
funds from international banks, combined with 
the liquidity problems which the countries had 
in meeting their increasing commitments, dis-
couraged the international financial system from 
continuing to channel funds to the Central 
American countries, or at least to most of them. 
Thus was tied the noose of financial strangula-
tion which is now affecting the majority of the 
Central American economies. 
the highest absolute levels of debt, in that order. 
In El Salvador and Guatemala the public debt 
exceeded the private debt, while in Honduras 
and Nicaragua the proportions were roughly 
equal, and in Costa Rica the private debt was 
greater (69%). 
The situation varied with respect to capacity 
to pay. In Costa Rica and Nicaragua the commit-
ments exceeded by about 50% the annual value 
of exports, and both the ratio of debt to product 
and the per capita debt were the highest in the 
subregion. At an intermediate level, the debt of 
Honduras was almost equivalent to the value of 
exports and represented 25 % of the product; El 
Salvador and Guatemala were in a more favoura-
ble position. The external debt contracted or 
guaranteed by the State was at a high level in 
I 
The external debt in 1970 
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Guatemala and Nicaragua (the two countries 
accounting for more than 50% of the Central 
American total), followed by Costa Rica, with a 
share of 31 %, and much smaller shares for Hon-
duras and El Salvador. 
From the beginning of the 1970s private 
sources of financing had been acquiring particu-
lar importance for the public sector. However, 
these operations were very different in nature 
from those of subsequent years. In most cases it 
was a question of placing public bonds with the 
overseas branches of the central banks for 
medium terms (between five and eight years) 
and at pre-established interest rates similar to 
those of other operations of the foreign banks at 
the time of the transaction.1 
In the region as a whole, 36% of the external 
public debt had been contracted with private 
'It must be remembered that at that time and up to 1982 
interest rates were regulated in the United States, the main supp-
lier of funds, and subject to specific limits. 
From 1974 two important phenomena occurred 
in the international capital market. The oil sur-
pluses generated by the price increase led to 
intense competition among the banks in the 
investment of these funds, at a time when inter-
est rates were even lower than world inflation. 
The developing countries that were major 
net importers of oil, such as the Central Ameri-
can countries, were doubly affected by the 
adverse developments in the world economy. On 
the one hand, they took the full impact of the 
increased prices of hydrocarbons and, on the 
other, they had to cope with the widespread 
increase in the prices of other imported goods. 
Furthermore, although shortly after these 
increases the prices of some of their own export 
commodities rose, they did so to a lesser extent 
than import prices. 
In these circumstances the countries of Cen-
tral America, like other countries of Latin Amer-
sources, and most of the debt with official sour-
ces (60%) was with multilateral financing 
bodies. 
In 1970 the region's external public debt 
service (interest and repayment of principal) 
represented 7% of the value of exports and a 
little under 13% of public expenditure. The 
situation was satisfactory for the majority of the 
Central American countries, although Nicara-
gua, Costa Rica and, to a lesser extent, Guate-
mala had higher percentages because of the high 
absolute level of debt which they had contracted. 
The debt burden was much less for Honduras 
and El Salvador, in that order. 
To sum up, Central America's total foreign 
debt was small in real terms in 1970, although in 
relation to other macroeconomic variables (pro-
duct and exports) it was already reaching signifi-
cant levels in Costa Rica and Nicaragua. In El 
Salvador and Guatemala, unlike other countries, 
the public debt accounted for a majority of bor-
rowing and in Guatemala it had been contracted 
mainly with private sources. 
ica, were faced with the dilemma of adjusting 
their economies to the new limits imposed by 
the world situation or maintaining their historic 
growth rates by mobilizing a larger volume of 
external resources. 
The effects of this latter option and the dif-
ferences in the particular emphasis and impor-
tance which each country attached to the two 
alternatives can be seen in the different situa-
tions in which these countries find themselves in 
the mid-1980s. 
When the external imbalance worsened in 
1974, the countries of the subregion decided, to 
varying degrees, to have recourse to external 
financing to ensure an adequate level of interna-
tional liquidity to meet the needs of their respec-
tive productive systems. As it was impossible to 
obtain sufficient funds from official multilateral 
or bilateral sources, they had to incur high and 
II 
Management of the changes in external financing 
126 CEPAL REVIEW No. 32 / August 1987 
increasing levels of debt with international pri-
vate banks. 
Three basic features distinguished this type 
of financing from financing obtained from offi-
cial sources: i) the loans did not have to be used 
to finance productive or development projects 
and they were usually used to meet the country's 
foreign currency commitments resulting from 
the trade deficit; ¡i) the agreed periods of the 
loans were short, especially for economies which 
tended to have recurrent imbalances in the cur-
rent account of the balance of payments; and, 
lastly, iii) most of these loans were contracted at 
variable interest rates based on those prevailing 
in the international market, at a time when it 
was difficult to foresee the level to which these 
rates would shortly rise. 
When the first of these loans were being 
contracted (and up to 1981), the United States 
financial system was regulated by the 1933 Bank-
ing Act which prevented the banks from paying 
interest on demand deposits and gave the Fed-
eral Reserve specific powers to set maximum 
limits on the interest rate in the majority of asset 
and liability operations. During the 1970s a 
number of changes were made in the United 
States financial system to liberalize it and stimu-
late savings. In 1980 the Depository Institution 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act pro-
vided, inter alia, for "the progressive phasing out 
of interest-rate ceilings over a six year period... 
2See Charles Collyns and Yusuke Horiguchi, "Financial 
supermarkets in the United States", Finance and Development, 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank, vol.21. No. 1, 
March 1984. 
The combination of the financial instability in 
the subregion and the weakening of economic 
activity strengthened the characteristic trend of 
external financing from the earlier period, and 
subsequently certain imbalances between the 
economies' capacity to pay and their commit-
ments grew stronger. 
from January 1981".2 This change in monetary 
policy and the changes in financial flows (caused 
by the decline in oil surpluses, the increased 
demand for funds by the productive apparatus 
and the increase in the United States fiscal 
deficit) swiftly produced spectacular interest rate 
rises in the international market. This increased 
considerably the interest payable on the external 
debt for all the countries and in particular for 
those which had opted to obtain massive financ-
ing from external sources before the rules of the 
game were changed in the system which is the 
main source of these funds. 
During this period the international situa-
tion was also affecting the operating costs of 
multilateral financing bodies. On the one hand, 
since the beginning of the 1980s the supply of 
ordinary funds had expanded more slowly than 
the demand and therefore there had been an 
increase in the proportion of special funds origi-
nating in several lending countries, which cost 
more than ordinary resources.3 On the other 
hand, the exchange rate changes among the 
creditor countries following the flotation of the 
dollar had increased the cost of the funds 
obtained from countries which had had to 
revalue their currencies. This was why, although 
slowly and gradually, the element of subsidy in 
the loans granted by official bodies4 had declined 
throughout the 1970s. 
'Although this cost is still above the international market 
interest rate. 
^Indicated by the difference between the interest rate charged 
and the international market rate, among other factors. 
From 1981 the growth rate of the total exter-
nal debt declined for Central America as a whole 
and in each of the countries except Guatemala. 
The average increase for the area, which had 
been 18.5% between 1978 and 1981, fell to 
17.8% in the three years 1981-1983 and to 8% 
between 1983 and 1986. But these rates were still 
III 
Recent evolution of external debt and 
situation in 1986 
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very dynamic in comparison with the weakening 
of other macroeconomic variables. Accordingly, 
in the period 1978-1986 the subregion's capacity 
to pay deteriorated to the point where several 
countries had to renegotiate their external com-
mitments. In 1983 the per capita debt of Central 
America averaged US$729 (more than double 
the 1978 figure), but the figures for Costa Rica 
and Nicaragua were especially high (US$1 400 
and US$1 700 respectively). In this same period 
the ratio of debt to domestic product doubled to a 
coefficient of 84 % for the subregion; it tripled in 
the case of Nicaragua. External liabilities 
amounted to more than three times the region's 
exports and the situation was particularly diffi-
cult for Nicaragua and, to a lesser extent, Costa 
Rica. 
The slowdown in the growth of the total 
external debt was due to the decline in private 
sector borrowing, for this sector paid its commit-
ments —by increasing external costs above 
internal interest rates— or succeeded in trans-
forming them into official sector liabilities. 
In contrast, the external public debt con-
tinued to increase between 1978 and 1981, 
thanks in particular to Guatemala, El Salvador 
and Nicaragua. In the following two years (1981-
1983) the increase moderated owing to the diffi-
culty encountered in 1983 in obtaining 
additional capital, although it was still 20%; this 
increase was of great importance in absolute 
terms owing to the high level of external public 
borrowing in the previous years. Finally, during 
the period 1983-1986 the region's public debt 
amounted to merely 9% owing to the sluggish-
ness of multilateral financing. 
From 1979 —shortly after the second 
increase in the prices of hydrocarbons— the 
external deficit had been eating into the interna-
tional monetary reserves, while the fiscal deficit 
was at an unprecedented level. At that point the 
governments had to decide between adjusting 
their economies to the circumstances imposed by 
the international recession (with all the political 
and social consequences implied by a decline in 
living standards), seeking to defer and soften the 
effects of the crisis through a policy of stimulat-
ing production (which implied an aggressive 
borrowing policy), or adopting a combination of 
these two options. 
In fact, owing to the particular circumstances 
produced by the social and political confronta-
tions in some countries of the region, none of the 
countries rejected the possibility of moderating 
the harmful effects of the crisis, although some 
of them placed greater emphasis on this and 
took action before the others. As a result, exter-
nal public financing became the decisive element 
in almost all economic policy; it served as the 
basic support for savings, it financed practically 
all public investment and covered the fiscal 
deficit, as well as providing international liquid-
ity for the external sector. 
As the purpose of this borrowing had been 
to moderate the external and internal imbalan-
ces rather than to finance far-reaching develop-
ment projects, part of the new debt had to be 
contracted with international banks which were 
already operating with variable interest rates 
and short terms. Accordingly, the participation 
of private sources in the region's total external 
public debt increased from 36% in 1970 to 42% 
in 1979 and to almost 50% in 1982. The same 
thing occurred in almost all the countries, and 
even when in 1983-1986 this proportion was 
forced down by the hardening of attitudes on the 
part of private sources of financing, the figures 
for Central America continued to be strongly 
influenced by those for Guatemala. 
The average terms of the new debt deterio-
rated perceptibly during the period 1980-1986 
and the burden of foreign debt service increased 
in all the countries. In 1986 the subregion had to 
allocate an average 39% of its exports to debt 
service, as against 1 1 % in 1978. This meant a 
very great effort, especially when it is remem-
bered that the prices of the main export goods 
showed a significant upturn in 1986. 
On the other hand, it must be borne in mind 
that these indicators and in general all the flows 
connected with the external debt have been 
affected during the past three years by arrears in 
the repayment of principal and even in the pay-
ment of interest, especially in the cases of Nica-
ragua and Costa Rica, countries which, being 
quite unable to meet their commitments, had 
recourse to renegotiation. The position of Nica-
ragua seems even more critical when the 1982 
coefficient5 is taken into account, and the results 
for Costa Rica were strongly influenced by the 
'Even though the results of part of the renegotiation were 
already included in this year. 
128 CEPAL REVIEW No. 32 / August 1987 
payment of arrears, the interest on which it had 
to settle in full between 1982 and 1983. 
The deterioration in the structure of the 
foreign debt was due, on the one hand, to the 
maturity of the loans contracted with private 
sources —the periods of which were insufficient 
for domestic economic recovery— and, on the 
other hand, to the sharp increase in interest rates 
in the international market from 1978, and to an 
even sharper increase since 1980, which affected 
a large part of Central America's external debt 
(about 30%). For example, in 1970 interest pay-
ments accounted for 29% of the external debt 
service for the whole region; by 1978 this figure 
had risen to 48% and despite the decline in 
interest rates in 1986 it was still above 36% in 
that year. 
Two countries (Guatemala and El Salvador) 
opted for a conservative-foreign borrowing pol-
icy, which enabled them by the end of the last 
decade to achieve the smallest amounts of debt 
with private sources. In the case of El Salvador 
these commitments have been declining in the 
past four years, partly as a result of the increas-
ing flows of official external aid and to remittan-
ces from nationals living abroad, which have 
helped to reduce the private financing require-
ment; however, the average terms of the new 
loans made in 1982 were clearly worse than 
those obtained in 1980. Guatemala increased the 
proportion of private sources of credit above the 
1978 level and from 1984 it did so at a faster rate, 
to the point where these sources accounted for 
42% of the external public debt in 1986. The 
general indicators of the terms of the debt con-
tracted in 1982 reflected a deterioration in com-
parison with the terms which had been 
maintained up to 1980. On the one hand, the 
average repayment period was much shorter, as 
was the average grace period; on the other, the 
interest rate was higher. 
At first, Honduras also maintained a conser-
vative attitude to obtaining external financing 
from private sources, but then it began to use 
this expedient rapidly, largely because its mone-
tary policy induced the country's private banks to 
obtain external financing to cope with the pres-
sure for loans from the productive apparatus. 
Accordingly, by the end of 1982 the proportion 
of foreign debt with private sources amounted to 
35% and the structure of the total external debt 
was clearly worse than in 1970. For example, the 
average repayment period of the 1982 loans was 
reduced to 11 years and the interest rate was 
doubled. 
At the other extreme, Nicaragua and Costa 
Rica opted for a massive reduction of external 
financing from private sources, although for dif-
ferent reasons. Whereas the rest of the countries 
opted for external borrowing of this kind as a 
means of coping with the effects of the crisis, the 
greater part of Nicaragua's debt had originated 
in external borrowing by the private sector 
which the State had to acknowledge and assume 
when the political situation changed. From 1980, 
therefore, the national authorities had to enter 
into complicated negotiations and in 1982 the 
proportion of the debt with private lenders had 
increased to 53% (i.e., 32% of the Central 
American debt with these sources). As a result of 
the renegotiation, the average repayment period 
for the external debt of Nicaragua contracted in 
1982 was about 10 years, with a grace period of 
six years and an interest rate of 9%, terms which 
were similar to the average for the region. 
Lastly, Costa Rica opted to maintain the 
existing rate of economic growth and its living 
standards by means of a vigorous borrowing 
policy. Thus, using the opportunities offered by 
the international capital market, Costa Rica 
obtained increasing proportions of its external 
public financing from private sources. It 
achieved its goals in the short term, but by mid-
1981 it found itself in a serious situation owing 
to a lack of international liquidity and it even fell 
behind In its payments. In 1984 foreign liabili-
ties of private origin accounted for 56% of Costa 
Rica's total liabilities and 36% of the Central 
American debt from that source. Accordingly, 
the average repayment and grace periods of the 
external public debt contracted by Costa Rica in 
1982 (six and two years respectively) and indeed 
the interest rate, were less favourable than the 
averages for the region. 
At the end of 1986 the total external debt of 
Central America amounted to US$17 200 mil-
lion and consisted mainly (95%) of public sector 
commitments. Nicaragua (5 700 million) and 
Costa Rica (3 740 million) accounted for more 
than half of the total external debt; El Salvador's 
share (2 100 million) was the smallest, and those 
of Guatemala and Honduras were roughly 
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US$2 640 and US$2 930 million respectively. 
With respect to the burden of the debt ser-
vice on exports and services, the 1986 indicators 
include a number of distortions, as was pointed 
out above, owing to the arrears incurred by some 
countries. In any event, Central America as a 
whole had to allocate 39% of its sales of goods 
and services to the payment of interest and prin-
cipal; this high figure illustrates the unfavoura-
ble terms on which most of the foreign debt had 
been contracted. The highest level (48%) was in 
El Salvador, which was able to meet this kind of 
commitment thanks to remittances from its 
nationals living abroad and the official grants 
which it received, and in Costa Rica, which con-
tinued to accumulate some arrears. For Guate-
mala the proportion exceeded 30%, and 
Nicaragua could only make payments represent-
ing 13 % of its exports, even though the commit-
ments which it had to incur during the year were 
much higher. 
The general deterioration in the terms of the 
foreign debt has certainly influenced the current 
payment difficulties of the Central American 
countries. However, it is thought that the 
greater problem for some of them is the absolute 
amount of the debt which has reached —and 
sometimes exceeded— the limits imposed by 
economic size and capacity to pay. 
As the foreign trade balance of the Central 
American countries deteriorated, mainly as a 
result of the worsening of the terms of trade and 
the higher interest payments on the external 
debt, the flight of capital assumed considerable 
proportions.6 Monetary reserves were falling 
and in the end totally used up. As the countries 
"•Although there is no official information on each individual 
country, the approximate amount of the flight of capital from 
Central America in the past five years will have exceeded US$4 500 
million. This estimate is based on a comparison of the results of the 
analysis of the balance of payments and the total amounts of the 
external debt according to exchange control records. 
The critical situation of Central America 
stands out against the Latin American back-
ground. In absolute terms, the subregion's total 
debt in 1986 represented only a little more than 
4% of the total Latin American debt, and that of 
the most heavily indebted Central American 
country (Nicaragua) represented a little more 
than 4% of the debt of Brazil; but in relative 
terms these countries, except for Guatemala, are 
in a very difficult position. In 1983 the average 
ratio of external debt to gross domestic product 
was 36% for Latin America but more than dou-
ble that amount (81%) for Central America; the 
ratios of three countries (Nicaragua, Costa Rica 
and Honduras) were by far the highest in Latin 
America, and that of El Salvador was close to the 
highest (Venezuela and Chile). It can thus be 
seen that Central America has acquired an exter-
nal debt which, in terms of its productive capac-
ity, is bigger than that of the rest of Latin 
America. 
The situation is similar with respect to the 
ratio of foreign debt to exports. Because of the 
high degree of openness of the Central Ameri-
can economies, the differences between them are 
smaller. Nicaragua has the region's highest 
ratio, and the average for Central America is 
higher than that of the other Latin American 
countries. 
were quite unable to meet their external debt 
commitments, delays occurred in the repayment 
of principal (and even in the payment of inter-
est) to the point where they were compelled to 
begin new negotiations to reprogramme the ser-
vice of the external debt with international pri-
vate banks and, in some cases, with official 
bilateral sources. 
These negotiations are usually conducted by 
the national authorities and ad hoc banking com-
mittees appointed by the lending banks in the 
case of private sources, or with the Club of Paris, 
made up of the main lending governments, in 
the case of the debt with bilateral sources. 
IV 
The renegotiation of the external debt 
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Although the negotiations are supposedly varied 
according to the economic characteristics and 
circumstances of each individual country, they 
have many features more or less is common. 
1. The IMF agreements 
The standby loan agreements with the IMF 
involve the signature of a letter of intention in 
which the country undertakes to adopt an adjust-
ment policy and meet certain concrete targets 
with respect to specific macroeconomic varia-
bles, so as to be able to make the (usually quar-
terly) payments agreed. This condition, which is 
intended to correct the fundamental imbalances 
in the economy, is applicable both to the finan-
cial support from the Fund and to the use of the 
resources obtained through the renegotiation.7 
The adjustment policy usually includes mea-
sures to cut back aggregate demand (by means of 
fiscal, monetary and income mechanisms) which 
seek to adapt the basic elements of the domestic 
market (supply and demand) to the situation,8 
and other measures to stimulate exports (by 
means of exchange and tariff mechanisms, etc.) 
with a view to reestablishing the foreign trade 
balance by shifting relative prices in favour of 
export goods at the expense of items of domestic 
consumption. It has often proved difficult to 
reconcile these measures with the national 
priorities. 
In the particular case of Central America, 
three countries concluded separate standby loan 
agreements in the past four years: Honduras in 
November 1982, Costa Rica one month later, 
and Guatemala at the end of August 1983.9 
These agreements included as a common 
denominator maximum limits on the growth of 
domestic monetary assets, domestic credit, the 
public sector deficit and the current expenditure 
'Although there are no formal requirements in this res pea, it 
has gradually become established practice that the signature of the 
required agreement means more for the countries than just the 
financial aid from the IMF —which represents a small proportion 
of the needs— and it has become an almost essential requirement 
for the subsequent granting of aid from the rest of the interna-
tional financial community. 
"The assumption is that the excess of imports over exports 
and the increase in domestic prices originate in an imbalance 
between purchasing power and domestic productive activity. 
'Nicaragua did not accept the involvement of the IMF in its 
agreements and, although it continued to meet its existing commit-
ments to that body, it has succeeded, as a very exceptional case, in 
negotiating without it. 
of the central government; they also stipulated 
an increase in the current revenue of the central 
government, in interest rates —to a level at 
which they were positive in real terms— and in 
the tariffs of public enterprises, as well as setting 
specific levels for net external assets. In the case 
of Costa Rica and Guatemala the agreements 
stipulated the payment of the arrears of princi-
pal and interest and exchange rate changes and, 
for Costa Rica, reductions in wages and salaries 
in real terms and specific levels of external pub-
lic borrowing. 
It can be seen that the terms imposed by the 
IMF for the granting of loans from its resources 
and for the possible renegotiation of a debt affect 
almost every aspect of the domestic economic 
policy of countries. 
For many reasons the three countries in 
question had difficulty in meeting some of these 
terms and the agreements were therefore sus-
pended before the end of the period originally 
agreed. At present these countries are at various 
stages of negotiation of new IMF agreements but 
no definite result has yet been achieved. 
In the case of Costa Rica, the terms imposed 
by the Fund include: elimination of 5 000 public 
jobs; reduction of the fiscal deficit to a minimum; 
elimination of the exchange losses of the Central 
Bank; and moderation of wage increases. Hon-
duras also held talks with the Fund in 1986 with 
a view to signing a standby loan agreement, with 
the discussion focussing on the central topics of 
reduction of the fiscal deficit and changes in the 
exchange rate. The most controversial topics in 
the case of Guatemala were exchange rate unifi-
cation, elimination of the losses of the Central 
Bank and the privatization of a number of public 
enterprises. 
2. The reprogramming agreements 
a) Nicaragua 
The dramatic social and political events 
which took place in Nicaragua in mid-1979 pre-
cipitated its financial crisis. As has already been 
pointed out, the new government took charge of 
the whole of the existing foreign debt, public and 
private. However, in view of the dire situation of 
the country's economy, the authorities stated 
that they could not meet the commitments, 
including some existing arrears. 
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Accordingly, after fairly broad financial and 
economic assistance had been obtained in the 
first year, an initial understanding was reached 
with the international banks at the end of 1980. 
The banks undertook, without the previous 
requirement of an IMF agreement, to renegotiate 
US$390 million —representing principal 
already due or payable between 1979 and 1982— 
with a grace period of five years, a repayment 
period of seven years (with half-yearly install-
ments) and a variable interest rate with a sur-
charge of between 0.75 and 1.5% above the 
LIBOR rate, but with a ceiling of 1%. The differ-
ence between the rate agreed and the rate paid 
would be capitalized and repayment would begin 
in 1985. In addition, the country undertook to 
pay the interest due (US$90 million) in half-
yearly installments over five years beginning in 
June 1981. 
At the same time Nicaragua attempted a 
global renegotiation of the bilateral debt with 
the Club of Paris. However, the lack of a formal 
agreement with the IMF made an overall settle-
ment difficult and in the end bilateral agree-
ments were made with most of the lending 
governments. 
During a second round at the end of 1982 the 
total commitments of the banking system —by 
then nationalized— were renegotiated as were 
those of the recently confiscated enterprises, 
which together amounted to a little over US$250 
million, on terms similar to those agreed in the 
earlier negotiation. 
Lastly, the other private debts acknowledged 
by the State —approximately US$100 million— 
have been the subject of special negotiations case 
by case or have been formalized with certificates 
of deposit —in dollars— for a period of five 
years and at an annual interest rate of 7%. 
Owing to its adverse economic circumstan-
ces, the country has not been able to meet some 
of the commitments programmed for 1983, and 
the authorities are therefore engaged in a new 
round of negotiations. 
b) Costa Rica 
As a result of the country's high level of 
foreign debt commitments and its critical 
domestic economic situation, in September 1981 
"the Government of the Republic and the Cen-
tral Bank notified their creditors, both official 
and banking, that Costa Rica could not continue 
the regular service of the debt".I0 From that time 
and up to mid-1982 both the repayment of prin-
cipal and the payment of interest on part of the 
outstanding foreign debt were declared in 
arrears, including the private debt consisting of 
matured liabilities for which the debtors had 
requested the necessary foreign exchange. Dur-
ing 1981 public debt commitments amounting to 
US$61 million of principal and US$121 million 
of interest remained unpaid. In June 1982 the 
total amount of arrears of interest was US$240 
million and the arrears of repayment of princi-
pal amounted to US$520 million; in the second 
half of that year a further US$300 million would 
fall due and in 1983 a further US$600 million 
would be due for payment. 
This situation demonstrated the need to res-
tructure most of the matured obligations with 
private creditors, including those which would 
be due for payment in 1982 and 1983, and var-
ious negotiations to this end were set in motion 
in the second half of 1982. 
Firstly, at the end of that year a new standby 
loan agreement was agreed with the IMF which 
included a loan of a little under US$100 million, 
and a second line of credit of US$20 million was 
established to offset fluctuations in overseas 
sales. 
Agreements were then reached with the 
majority of the unilateral creditors (Club of 
Paris) to reprogramme a little under US$140 
million of principal over a period of five years, 
with five years of grace and half-yearly payments 
beginning in September 1987. 
In 1981 a co-ordinating committee drawn 
from 12 of the 170 creditor banks was set up to 
deal with the debt to international banks.11 The 
negotiations moved slowly but significant 
l0See Proyecto de Ley de Ratificación del Acuerdo de Refman-
damiento de ¿a Deuda Pública Externa, and Convenio de Crédito 
Revolutivo suscrito entre elBanco Central de Costa Rica, la Repub-
lica de Costa Rica y los bancos acreedores, San José, 24 November 
1983, mimeo. 
"The Committee was chaired by the Bank of America and 
included representatives from; Bank of Montreal, Bankers Trust 
Company, Citibank, Deutsche-Siidamerikanische Bank, Industrial 
Bank of Japan, Lloyds Bank International, Marine Midland Bank, 
Royal Bank of Canada, Security Pacific National Bank and Wells 
Fargo Bank. 
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results began to emerge in the second half of 
1982, once the initial terms of reference had 
been established, and even more so when the 
standby loan agreement was concluded with the 
IMF. 
This first stage was long and complex 
because Costa Rica was one of the first Latin 
American countries to fall behind in its pay-
ments, and it was certainly difficult for the lend-
ing banks to understand the depths of financial 
difficulty that the country had reached.12 
Lastly, in December 1983 a first reprogram-
ming agreement was concluded, not only on the 
payment of the capital due (1981 and 1982) but 
also on the payments for 1983 and 1984; this 
means, and it is very exceptional, that four years' 
commitments had been renegotiated. The total 
amount negotiated was US$617 million, of 
which 9 5 % of "Stage I", amounting to US$475 
million, was restructured over a period of eight 
and a half years beginning in January 1983, 
including four years of grace (1983-1986) during 
which only the interest would be paid; the 
remaining 5% was to be paid on 31 January 
1984. "Stage II" (US$142 million) was restruc-
tured over a period of seven and a half years 
beginning in January 1984, also with four years 
of grace. 
With respect to the operating costs, the mar-
gins agreed with the banks for the restructured 
portion were 2.25% above the LIBOR rate or 
2.125% above the United States preferential 
rate. In addition, the charges for deferred pay-
ments and refinancing were set at 0.25 and 1.0% 
respectively. 
Lastly, in order to bring the payment of the 
interest due up to date, Costa Rica obtained a 
revolving commercial imports credit for 50% of 
the total amount of current interest and matured 
interest —which in practice represented 80% of 
the matured interest— for a term of three years 
and at a rate of 1.75% above the LIBOR rate or 
1.652% above the United States preferential 
rate. 
In mid-1986 a number of difficulties ree-
merged with regard to the payment of foreign 
commitments. The authorities obtained a meet-
L2See the Proyecto de Ley de Ratificación del Acuerdo de 
Refinanciamiento de la Deuda Pública Externa, op.cit. 
ing with 150 commercial banks with a view to 
renegotiating US$1 600 million on the follow-
ing conditions proposed by Costa Rica: a term of 
25 years with seven years of grace, interest rates 
below the United States preferential rate and 
payment limited to US$5 million a month until 
the US$30 million of interest arrears was met. 
These negotiations were not in fact held because 
the commercial banks required, before they 
would consider the proposal, that Costa Rica 
should sign a standby loan agreement with the 
IMF and pay the arrears of interest from June 
1986. 
c) Honduras 
In Honduras too the burden of external debt 
service on the meager supply of foreign 
exchange had become a problem in 1982, 
although less serious than in the cases described 
above. Accordingly, talks were started with the 
private banks in that year with a view to restruc-
turing the payment of part of the principal due. 
The negotiations continued in 1983, when 
the payments due in 1984 were also included, so 
that the amount involved totalled a little under 
US$125 million. In the middle of that year an 
agreement was reached in principal, under 
which Honduras obtained a restructuring of its 
debt in an amount of US$123 million with a 
term of seven years including three years of 
grace, and with a variable interest rate equival-
ent to 2.375% above the LIBOR rate or 2.25% 
above the United States preferential rate, plus 
commissions of 0.375% for deferment of pay-
ment and 1% for refinancing. However, the 
agreement remained pending owing, on the one 
hand, to disagreements about the amount of 
additional credit which would form part of the 
package and, on the other, to the condition that 
the agreement should be dependent on a standby 
loan agreement with the International Monetary 
Fund, which it had not been possible to conclude. 
In any event, Honduras acted as if the renegotia-
tion had already been formalized with the 
implicit sanction of the creditors and it therefore 
stopped making part of the principal repay-
ments to private sources, although by the end of 
1983 it had paid all the interest on its foreign 
debt. 
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The lengthy process of renegotiation of the 
debt with international private banks was 
resumed in 1986. The agreement was to cover an 
amount of US$218 million and, in principal, 
would meet the payments falling due between 
1987 and 1989- The Honduran authorities pro-
posed the renegotiation of 100% of these 
amounts, with a term of 16 years for repayment 
of the principal, three years of grace and the 
London interbank interest rate without surchar-
ge.The Co-ordinating Committee of the Creditor 
Banks proposed the immediate payment of 10% 
and, for the remaining 90%, a term of 14 years, 
including three years of grace, and interest at the 
LIBOR rate plus 1.75%. 
The region's payment capacity over the next 
eight years (1987-1994) will be determined in 
part by the extent to which it can be offered hope 
of recovery of the international economy; but 
also by the domestic effort which it makes to 
achieve a sustained and significant surplus in the 
current account of the balance of payments, and 
by the financial support of the international 
community in response to that effort. We will 
now give some estimates which may serve as a 
frame of reference for assessment both of the 
domestic effort and of the international co-
operation. 
The calculations have been based primarily 
on the forecasts of the burden of the existing 
debt —principal and interest— on the average 
terms prevailing in 1986, taking into account the 
renegotiations obtained by Costa Rica and Nica-
ragua. Account has also been taken of the possi-
ble performance of exports in accordance with a 
reasonably optimistic assumption: the volume 
and prices of Central American exports will 
grow gradually during the period until they 
reach the highest levels recorded between 1970 
and 1985. 
On the basis of these forecasts it is clear that 
each of the countries of the region will have to 
withstand at least three critical years in what 
d) Guatemala 
Although Guatemala had generally been 
able to meet its external commitments, the 
amounts due on the loans contracted recently by 
the Central Bank and certain temporary arrears 
had obliged the authorities to seek reprogram-
ming on a case by case basis. During 1986 they 
managed to renegotiate US$202 million of pay-
ments due in 1986 and 1987 owed to three credi-
tors (one private international financier, the 
Bank of Mexico and the Investment Fund of 
Venezuela). The terms varied in each case, but 
they consisted basically of longer repayment 
periods. 
remains of this decade. Furthermore, even more 
serious problems could arise if the commitments 
already entered into for these years are disre-
garded and new external financing is contracted 
with a repayment programme which includes 
this period. 
To begin with the most immediate problem, 
the forecasts indicate that Nicaragua and Costa 
Rica will have more acute difficulties in the 
shorter term and over a longer period. The diffi-
culties will perhaps be fewer for Honduras and 
EI Salvador, but they will arrive quickly, 
although for a shorter period in the case of El 
Salvador; Guatemala will also have to cope with 
immediate tensions, although they will be less 
severe. 
In absolute terms, and assuming that the 
present interest rates are maintained, the subre-
gion will have to pay a little under US$15 000 
million between 1987 and 1994 in principal and 
interest payments on the existing external pub-
lic debt, in annual installments ranging between 
US$2 700 and US$1 100 million. If overseas 
sales perform as forecast, the ratio of debt ser-
vice to exports will exceed 40% in the period 
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Even without taking into account the service 
of any debt contracted from 1987, Nicaragua, the 
region's most heavily indebted country, will find 
itself in an extremely difficult position, for it will 
have to pay somewhat more than US$4 000 mil-
lion (26 % of the external payments of the whole 
region) in annual amounts which may represent 
more than double its overseas sales in 1988 and 
more than 100% of sales at the end of the 
decade. 
Costa Rica will have to pay about US$4 000 
million (27% of the region's total) and this will 
be very difficult, for the annual commitment will 
represent more than 45% of its exports during 
1987-1989 and more than 25% up to 1992. 
Such prolonged efforts of this kind are quite 
incompatible with these countries' capacity to 
respond, so that even given broad access to new 
flows of capital, it seems inevitable that in the 
short term they will have to begin a new round of 
negotiations to enable them to spread their pres-
ent obligations over a much longer period and, 
above all, to ensure that the new financing does 
not include the present decade in its repayment 
programme. 
The other three countries will be faced with 
a less critical situation but, on average, they will 
have to allocate around 30% of their exports to 
service of the external public debt over the next 
fouryears (1987-1990) and maintain high coeffi-
cients in the following two years. It is thought 
that the difficult period will be shorter for Gua-
temala and that the coefficient, which may be 
more than 40% in 1988, will decline rapidly 
from 1992. 
Of course the situation could turn even more 
serious if the effects of the international eco-
nomic recovery on the Central American econ-
omy are delayed or weaker than expected, or if 
there should be a return to the upward trend of 
interest rates in the international capital 
markets. The effects of the high public expendi-
ture on security and defence should not be for-
gotten, for it has eroded —directly or 
indirectly— the financial capacity of some 
governments and forced them to borrow more 
from abroad. If this situation persists in the 
future, the prospects will be even more gloomy. 
It is thought therefore that in the next seven 
years the region's payment capacity will be small 
in terms of the existing commitments, even tak-
ing into account the possibility of a prolonged 
and significant recovery in the international 
economy with beneficial effects on the econo-
mies of the area. 
This limitation is due, generally speaking, to 
the inability of the countries to generate sur-
pluses in the current account of the balance of 
payments. Moreover, even for those which have 
the best conditions and a debt which is still 
manageable in the light of other economic and 
financial variables, there persists a problem of 
financial constraint which will compel them to 
obtain new loans. In the medium term this may 
tend to worsen the average terms of the debt. 
It must also be remembered that the coun-
tries with the greatest current difficulties will 
have to resort to costly and lengthy renegotia-
tions which will mean further deterioration in 
their foreign commitments but will enable them 
to ease the tensions of the system only temporar-
ily. In fact, so far the negotiations have not 
succeeded in bringing the debt into line with the 
countries' real capacities; they have always 
involved a considerable increase in expenditure 
by way of the costs of renegotiation, banking 
commissions and risk surcharges above the rate 
in the international capital market. As a general 
rule, the agreed repayment periods have been 
too short to secure the recovery of the payment 
capacity of the applicant country, and this has led 
to further reprogramming of the debt with even 
higher costs. 
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VI 
The initiatives of the international community 
As awareness of the critical social, political and 
economic situation of Central America has pene-
trated abroad, the international community has 
taken a number of initiatives to determine mea-
sures and mechanisms that might contribute in 
some way to a solution. The results of these 
initiatives will of course considerably improve 
the subregion's prospects, for although the 
resources it needs to solve its problems 
—financial and economic in general— are 
beyond its own means, they are small in terms of 
international financial flows. 
1. The Caribbean Basin Initiative 
The first initiative was presented in July 1981, 
when the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Can-
ada, the United States, Mexico and Venezuela 
met at Nassau in the Bahamas. On that occasion 
all the participants expressed their common 
concern about the economic and social problems 
of the countries of the Caribbean and Central 
America. The Ministers stressed the need for 
financial resources to be channelled to Central 
America to help to improve the situation and 
they thought that their efforts should be based 
on a process of consultation through which 
potential donors and recipients could come to a 
realistic understanding of the problems and 
aspirations of the countries of the basin, based 
on the national plans and priorities of those 
countries and on the available means of coping 
with their problems. On the basis of an agree-
ment in principle to the effect that the external 
co-operation would have to be used essentially to 
promote economic and social development and 
that "the donor countries" would remain free to 
choose the countries with which they co-
operated and the ways in which they could best 
help, the Ministers resolved to begin immediate 
consultations with the governments of Central 
America and the Caribbean and with other coun-
tries and international financial institutions. 
The purpose of these consultations would be to 
determine the best procedure for agreeing a plan 
of action to facilitate trade, investment or co-
operation measures which would stimulate sus-
tained and balanced economic and social 
development in the region.13 
In February 1982 the Government of the 
United States unilaterally informed the Organi-
zation of American States (OAS) of the three 
areas of action included in its so-called Caribbean 
Basin Initiative: trade, investment and financial 
assistance. The basic element is support for trade 
activities through the decision to open a free 
trade zone for a period of up to 12 years with no 
requirement of reciprocity for the majority of 
the exports from the countries of the Caribbean 
Basin, except for those of Cuba, Grenada and 
Nicaragua. This was given concrete form in the 
submission —and subsequent approval by the 
United States Congress in 1983— of the Carib-
bean Basin Economic Recovery Act.14 The 
majority of the countries concerned had indi-
cated their interest in this possibility, but with-
out underestimating the difficulties of achieving 
visible results in the short term, owing partly to 
the supply limitations of the Central American 
countries, whose products were not up to the 
standards of quality and homogeneity demanded 
in the United States market. 
The second element of the initiative was to 
offer incentives for private United States invest-
ment in the countries of the basin by means of 
tax exemptions. However, it seems unlikely that 
significant progress will be made in this direc-
tion, at least while the political conflicts and 
tensions persist in the region and until a solution 
is found to the difficulties experienced by the 
integration programme and intra-zonal trade. It 
would also seem difficult for foreign investment 
to reach the level needed by these countries. This 
at least is what past experience indicates, for 
foreign investment has made only a modest con-
tribution to flows of finance from abroad and to 
the formation of capital. 
"See the Communication of the Conference of Ministers on 
the Development of the Caribbean, Nassau, Bahamas, 11 July 1981. 
l1See Ley de recuperación económica de los países de lu 
Cuenca del Caribe, Acuerdos Generales sobre A ranéeles Aduaneros 
y Comercio (L/5577), H November 19H3-
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The third element in the programme is an 
allocation for emergency economic assistance 
which in 1982 amounted to US$350 million for 
the 27 countries of the Caribbean Basin covered 
by the initiative. 
2. The multilateral initiative promoted by 
the Inter-American Development Bank 
In response to the Caribbean Basin initiative, the 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Central America 
and Panama stated in the Declaration of Teguci-
galpa15 their political will to enter jointly into 
negotiations to obtain higher levels of external 
co-operation for the region and they prepared an 
institutional plan to facilitate the mobilization of 
the aid.16 
In 1982 the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB) assumed the task entrusted to it by 
the governments of the Central American Isth-
mus of seeking to mobilize a greater volume of 
external financing for the countries of the 
region. To this end, the Bank's Administration 
carried out preparatory work for the organiza-
tion of a forum of potential donor countries and 
the six countries of the Isthmus (including 
Panama). The first meeting of this kind was held 
in Brussels in September 1983. It was attended 
by representatives of the governments of Cen-
tral America and of the international financial 
community, with a view to presenting the 
requirements for financial co-operation of each 
of the countries of Central America individually 
and of the region as a whole. On this same 
occasion a consultative meeting was held, at the 
invitation of the Central American govern-
ments, with the representatives of private com-
mercial banks.17 
L5See Secretariat of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hondu-
ras, Declaration of Tegucigalpa, annex to the Informe del Relator 
de la Reunion de Cancilleres del Istmo Centroamericano, Teguci-
galpa, 15 August 1981, mimeo. 
L6For more details on the proceedings, agreements and insti-
tutional development see ECLAC, Evolución de la integración cen-
troamericana en ¡981 (E/CEPAL/MEX/198I/LÍ7),MexicoCity, 
7 May 1982. 
"See Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Special Pro-
gramme Meeting for the Development of the Central American 
Isthmus, Summary, Brussels, 13-15 September 1983, Washing-
ton.DC. (ICA-5), 11 October 1983, mimeo. 
A second and less formal meeting was held 
subsequently on the occasion of the Assembly of 
the Governors of the Bank held at Punta del 
Este, Uruguay, in April 1984. This meeting 
began to consider the possibility of translating 
the Bank's initiative into the creation of a formal 
consultative group which would include the five 
Central American countries.18 
At the same time the bank has been engag-
ing in various activities, including in particular 
advice to the countries on the structuring of 
investment programmes. It has also collaborated 
with the countries in their efforts to stimulate 
production by means of a financing programme 
for industrial rehabilitation and recovery and to 
boost exports through the establishment of 
bilateral agreements of partial scope. 
3. The Contadora Initiative 
At the beginning of 1983 the Foreign Ministers 
of Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela set 
up the so-called Contadora Group at a meeting 
held on the island of that name in Panama. The 
Group has of course engaged in intensive diplo-
matic activity to promote peace and détente in 
Central America, but this initiative also has an 
economic aspect. Taking a broad view of the 
origins of the subregion's conflicts, the Group 
vigorously supported the Action Committee in 
Support of the Economic and Social Develop-
ment of Central America (CADESCA) within the 
framework of the Latin American Economic Sys-
tem (SELA), which is intended, inter alia, to carry 
out a number of activities in support of the 
mobilization of resources and financial co-
operation for the subregion.19 This body will also 
facilitate the expected collaboration of the inter-
national community and will be able to improve 
the outlook for the Central American economy. 
l8For some of the background to this initiative see ECLAC, 
Istmo Centroamericano: el carácter de la crisis económica actual, 
los desafíos que plantea y la cooperación internacional que 
demanda (E/CEPAL/CŒ/402/Rev.l), Mexico City, July 1981. 
"See SELA, Reunión de Consultay Constitución del Comité de 
Apoyo al Desarrollo Económico y Social de Centroamérica 
(CADF.SCA), Panama, 13 to 15 December 1983, and Action Com-
mittee for Support of the Economic and Social Development of 
Central America, first regular meeting, Informe del Relator, 
Anexo l, Programa de Trabajo ¡9&4-¡985, Mexico City, 1 to 6 
March 1984. 
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4. The initiative of the National Bipartisan 
Commission on Central America of the 
United States Government 
With a view to obtaining bipartisan support for 
its foreign policy towards Central America and 
formulating a long-term position as to how the 
United States can contribute to the region's 
development, at the beginning of 1983 the Uni-
ted States Administration established a biparti-
san commission which completed its work in 
January 1984 with the submission of the so-
called "Jackson Report".20 This document states 
that "unless there is a substantial increase in aid, 
in our view, the prospects for recovery are bleak. 
The solution to the crisis of Central America 
does not lie along the path of austerity. We 
believe that the people of the region must at a 
minimum perceive a reasonable prospect that, 
with sustained effort on their part, they can 
reach 1980 levels of per capita economic activity 
by no later than 1990... External financing needs 
between now and 1990 have been estimated at as 
much as US$524 billion for the seven countries 
as a group".21 The Commission thought that 
multilateral financing bodies, other official lend-
2llSee Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on 
Central America, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing 
Office, January 1984, pp. 52-53. 
2LThe five Central American countries, Panama and Belize. 
From the arguments given above it can be seen 
that the Central American economies have had 
to cope with serious external financial imbalan-
ces caused mainly by the increase in the external 
debt service and the additional reduction of for-
eign exchange for other reasons. This increase 
derives from loans —especially from private 
sources— contracted increasingly for short 
terms and at variable interest rates which have 
proved to be particularly high. 
As the economic imbalance grew worse and 
the countries of the Isthmus came closer to a 
critical liquidity position, both the payment of 
ing institutions, private investors and commer-
cial banks would be able to provide about half of 
this amount and that the remainder (US$12 000 
million) "would have to be supplied by the Uni-
ted States". 
With respect to the problems of external 
debt, the Commission thought that the countries 
of the region should be encouraged to seek the 
renegotiation of their debts multilaterally, in 
contrast with the existing practice, which is 
essentially one of reaction. It went on to state 
that it was not intended that this should affect 
the debt negotiations of countries outside Cen-
tral America, but it was felt that the debt burden 
should be treated as part of the emergency stabil-
ization effort. 
The report sets out in general terms an illus-
trative institutional structure which would 
include an organization for the development of 
Central America and would be supported by a 
great variety of sources of economic information 
and analysis..., including for example the pro-
ceedings of the economic advisory group now 
being organized by the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank. 
Despite all these efforts there has been no 
major progress in obtaining from the interna-
tional community the financial resources 
urgently needed by the subregion to ensure a 
reasonable chance of economic recovery. 
interest and the repayment of principal fell into 
arrears and began to accumulate, especially with 
respect to the international banks and bilateral 
financing sources, and the countries of the subre-
gion were obliged to undertake intense and pro-
longed renegotiation of the debt. 
These negotiations have been accompanied 
by financing agreements with the International 
Monetary Fund in almost all the countries. 
These agreements usually stipulate a commit-
ment to carry out economic stabilization pro-
grammes which include various restrictions on 
total domestic demand combined with export 
VII 
Some conclusions 
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incentive policies, and they envisage, inter a¿ta, 
limits on the public sector deficit, a tight mone-
tary policy, prudent wage adjustments, pricing 
policies to restore to market forces their regula-
tory role in the allocation of resources, and real-
istic exchange and interest rate policies which 
favour flexibility in external trade and the mobil-
ization of domestic savings. 
Even when the renegotiations have eased 
the pressures of debt service on the external 
imbalance —and to a large extent on the fiscal 
imbalance as well— results have so far proved 
unsatisfactory. Firstly, the renegotiation of the 
debt has meant an increase in the surcharges on 
the base rates to cover the costs due to the pay-
ment of arrears and the greater doubt as to the 
recovery of the loans. Furthermore, a percentage 
has been applied in respect of "deferred charges" 
and "refinancing" of part of the debt, and the 
banks have charged other commissions, in their 
capacity as agents, for arranging the commit-
ment of funds, opening of letters of credit, and 
legal fees. Secondly, the repayment periods have 
not been compatible with the real economic pos-
sibilities, especially as they have been deter-
mined to a large extent by expectation of the 
beneficial effects of the assumed international 
economic recovery and of the elimination of 
internal obstacles. 
As to the stabilization policy —which in any 
event requires a relatively long period for its 
expected results to emerge— it obliges the coun-
tries to operate within a stringent austerity pro-
gramme which makes it difficult for them to 
overcome production limitations and reduces 
their capacity to initiate a domestic economic 
recovery to restore the region's capacity to ser-
vice its external debt. 
Accordingly, and taking into account the 
challenges (different in degree but of the same 
kind) which the Central American countries will 
have to take up in the remaining years of this 
decade, they will have to establish a cautious 
foreign borrowing policy with respect both to 
the possible renegotiation of part of the current 
debt and to the signing of new commitments. 
Where renegotiation is concerned, it will be 
necessary to determine the critical period in 
which arrears will be inevitable, so as to preempt 
the need to begin a new reprogramming process. 
The debtor countries will thus be in a stronger 
position and will be able to undertake multilat-
eral negotiations and eliminate some of the addi-
tional costs resulting from the current payment 
arrears. 
It will also be necessary to analyse the true 
economic prospects for each country, in order to 
ensure that the repayment periods are consistent 
with their real capacity, thus avoiding a series of 
renegotiations, each of which increases the costs. 
The international community will have to 
show greater understanding of the region's eco-
nomic problems, which stretch beyond the pres-
ent economic crisis and into the long term, for in 
fact there are three juxtaposed crises: the general 
economic crisis, the crisis of the subregional 
integration programme and the social and politi-
cal crisis. 
The negotiating position of the Central 
American countries will of course be streng-
thened to the extent that they devise forms of 
joint action or establish agreements for con-
certed reaction. In this connection, it would seem 
that the solution of the crisis of the Central 
American Common Market warrants high 
priority. 
With respect to the signing of new external 
financing commitments, the experience of the 
past will have to be taken into account in 
national borrowing strategies. Firstly, recourse 
to private sources will have to be reserved 
strictly for the financing of highly profitable 
activities which have a direct effect on the gener-
ation of foreign exchange, and the gestation 
periods of these activities will have to be consist-
ent with the repayment periods of the debt. This 
means that in future priority will have to be 
given to official external financing from multi-
lateral and bilateral sources, and it will therefore 
be necessary to revive the national capacity to 
devise development projects, as far as possible 
with a low imports content. 
The allocation of the resources among var-
ious sectors and institutions will also have to be 
determined with care. The foreign debt has also 
caused financial imbalances and domestic bottle-
necks when the resources have been channelled 
to institutions with little capacity to generate 
their own funds (in the national currency), and 
as a result their commitments have reverted to 
the enfeebled public exchequer. 
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In any event, in the years ahead it will be 
essential to apply a clear foreign borrowing pol-
icy which enhances the impact of the resources 
obtained on the national economies, in contra-
distinction to what has happened in recent years. 
This is of particular importance because the net 
external resources which can be expected are 
much smaller than those received in previous 
years, because the region has serious problems of 
recovery and reconstruction and because, in the 
end, it will have to revert to the basic principle 
that external resources are a complement to and 




CENTRAL AMERICA: BALANCE OF TOTAL DEBT DISBURSED, 
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1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
9 834 11 962 13 655 15 106 16 267 17 177 













































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, based on figures of the World Bank, the Bank for International Settlements and the International Monetary Fund 
'Refers to the external public debt from 1980. 
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Table 2 
CENTRAL AMERICA: RATIOS OF TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT TO POPULATION, 
PRODUCT AND EXPORTS, 1970-1986 
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Source: ECLAC, based on World Bank and official figures. 
"From 1979 these are the preliminary population figures estimated by the Planning Ministry (MIPLAN), which differ from theCELADE 
estimates. 
6
 At current prices. 
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Table 3 
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Source: ECLAC: for 1970-1982, based on figures of the World Bank, the Bank for International Settlements and the International Monetary Fund; for 1983-
1986, preliminary estimates based on official data. 
"Includes Central Bank debt. 
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Table 4 
CENTRAL AMERICA: SERVICE OF THE EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT, 
BY COMPONENT, 1970-1986 
1970 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, based on figures of the World Bank, the Bank for International Settlements and the International Monetary Fund. 
"Includes service of the Central Bank debt. 
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Table 5 








































1976 1977 1978 1979 














































































































































Source: ECLAC, based on table 4. 
"From 1980 public expenditure refers to the central governments. 
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Table 6 
CENTRAL AMERICA: AVERAGE GROWTH RATES OF 

















































































































Source: ECLAC, based on official figures. 
"From 1981 refers to the external public debt. 
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Table 7 
CENTRAL AMERICA: AVERAGE TERMS OF EXTERNAL 

























































































































Source; ECLAC, based on World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank figures. 
"Refers to the average terms of the new loans signed in the years indicated. 
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Table 8 
LATIN AMERICA: TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT AND ITS RATIO TO 1983 


































































































































4 i y 
Source: For Central America: ECLAC, based on official and World Bank figures; and for the other countries: CEPAL, 
Politicas de ajuste y renegociación de la deuda externa (E/CEPAL/G.1299), Santiago, Chile, 1984. 
"Preliminary figures. 
*Total public and private external debt. 
'Public debt. 
''includes officially guaranteed public and private debt plus non-guaranteed long- and short-term debt with financial 
institutions which report to the Bank for International Settlements. 
'Interest on the total external debt. 
'Service of the total external debt. 
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Table 9 
CENTRAL AMERICA: FORECASTS OF THE PUBUC DEBT SERVICE 
ON THE DEBT DISBURSED AT THE END OF 1986 































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, based on World Bank figures. 
Table 10 
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Table 11 
CENTRAL AMERICA: RATIO OF PUBLIC DEBT SERVICE TO 







































































Source: ECLAC, based on tables 9 and 10. 
